Dynamic duopoly with best-price clauses

This article investigates best-price clauses as a strategic devise to facilitate collusion in a dynamic duopoly game. Best-price clauses guarantee rebates on the purchase price if a customer finds a better price after his purchase. Two different price clauses are distinguished: "most favored customer" and "meet or release." I examine the collusive potential of both clauses in a finite-horizon duopoly model with homogeneous durable goods. In each period, new consumers enter the market. I show that in this context, meet-or-release clauses have a greater anticompetitive potential than most-favored-customer clauses

When is FDI a Capital Flow?

In this paper we analyze the conditions under which a foreign direct investment (FDI) involves a net capital flow across countries. Frequently, foreign direct investment is financed in the host country without an international capital movement. We develop a model in which the optimal choice of financing an international investment trades off the relative costs and benefits associated with the allocation and effectiveness of control rights resulting from the financing decision. We find that the financing choice is driven by managerial incentive problems and that FDI involves an international capital flow when these problems are not too large. Our results are consistent with data from a survey on German and Austrian investments in Eastern Europe

Technology Transfer and Spillovers in International Joint Ventures

This paper analyzes the effects of a potential spillover on technology transfer of a multinational enterprise and on the host country policy. In particular, we examine how both parties' incentives can be controlled through the ownership structure in an international joint venture. In contrast to existing arguments we show that spillovers must not always have negative effects on technology transfer and they may be efficiency improving. Moreover, there are circumstances where a joint venture is mutually beneficial. Surprisingly, however, we find that despite the prospect of spillovers a joint venture is sometimes not in the interest of a host country

Who is Afraid of Political Risk? Multinational Firms and their Choice of Capital Structure

This paper investigates how multinational firms choose their capital structure in response to political risk. We focus on two choice variables, the leverage and the ownership structure of the foreign affiliate, and we distinguish different types of political risk, like expropriation, corruption and confiscatory taxation, and In our theoretical analysis we find that as political risk increases the ownership share always decreases whereas leverage can both increase or decrease, depending on the type of political risk. Using the Microdatabase Direct Investment of the Deutsche Bundesbank, we find supportive evidence for these different effects

Entry of Foreign Banks and their Impact on Host Countries

Foreign bank entry is frequently associated with spillover effects for local banks and increasing competition in the local banking market. We study the impact of these effects on host countries. In particular, we ask how these effects interact and how they depend on the competitive environment of the host banking market. An increasing number of banks is more likely to have positive welfare effects the more competitive the market environment, whereas spillovers are less likely to have positive welfare effects the stronger competition. Hence, competitive effects seem to reinforce each other, while spillovers and competition tend to weaken each other

Creditor Rights and Debt Allocation within Multinationals

We analyze the optimal debt structure of multinational corporations choosing between centralized or decentralized borrowing. We identify how this choice is affected by creditor rights and bankruptcy costs, taking into account managerial incentives and coinsurance considerations. We find that partially centralized borrowing structures are optimal with either weak or strong creditor rights. For intermediate levels of creditor rights fully decentralized (centralized) borrowing structures are optimal if managers have strong (weak) empire building dencies. Decentralized borrowing is more attractive for companies focussing on short-term profitability. Credits are rather taken in countries with better creditor rights and more efficient insolvency systems

Trade liberalization and credit constraints: Why opening up may fail to promote convergence

Recent evidence suggests that despite opening up a country for trade, the productivity gap between developed and emerging economies often does not close. This paper examines credit constraints as one channel held responsible for hampering convergence. Specifically, we extend a Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) type trade model with variable mark-ups to allow for endogenous technology adoption. We consider a framework with two countries that potentially differ with respect to credit market development. Firms have the option to adopt a more efficient technology by paying some fixed cost. A fraction of the fixed technology adoption cost has to be financed externally: in a less developed credit market, the costs of external finance and thus the total costs of technology adoption are higher. A reduction in trade costs raises demand abroad (pro technology-adoption effect) but reduces demand at home because of import competition (anti technology-adoption effect). We find that trade liberalization increases economic performance, that is average productivity and technology adoption, in both countries but that the productivity gap widens. Simulations show that the welfare gap widens too. Opening up without sufficient access to external funding thus fails to promote convergence

Entry of Foreign Banks and their Impact on Host Countries

Foreign bank entry is frequently associated with spillover effects for local banks and increasing competition in the local banking market. We study the impact of these effects on host countries. In particular, we ask how these effects interact and how they depend on the competitive environment of the host banking market. An increasing number of banks is more likely to have positive welfare ffects the more competitive the market environment, whereas spillovers are less likely to have positive welfare effects the stronger competition. Hence, competitive effects seem to reinforce each other, while spillovers and competition tend to weaken each other

Financial constraints and innovation: Why poor countries don't catchup

We examine micro-level channels of how financial development can affect macroeconomic outcomes like the level of income and export intensity. We investigate theoretically and empirically how financial constraints affect a firm's innovation and export activities, using unique firm survey data which provides direct measures for innovations and firm-specific financial constraints. We find that financial constraints restraint heability of domestically owned firms to innovate and export and hence to catch up to the technological frontiers. This negative effect is amplified as financial constraints force export and innovation activities to become substitutes although they are generally natural complements

Technology Transfer and Spillovers in International Joint Ventures

It is often argued that multinationals are reluctant to transfer technology due to the fear of spillovers. We show that this need not be the case if host country policies like taxation are taken into account. Furthermore, we examine the incentives the multinational and the host country have to engage in an international joint venture. We show why a multinational may agree to enter a joint venture even though this gives rise to spillovers. Surprisingly, we find that a joint venture is sometimes not in the interest of a host country, despite the prospect of spillovers